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These tributes by a president and a speaker of the House more than twenty-eight years apart are high praise for two organizations that are both commonly known as think tanks. Yet, in their praise, Johnson and Gingrich characterize the accomplishments of these organizations in notably different terms: Brookings for its "painstaking research" and "objective writing," Heritage for its "far-reaching" efforts in the "war of ideas." These characterizations evoke two quite different images and suggest quite different understandings of the role of think tanks in American politics. The first emphasizes their role as producers of credible expertise; the second highlights their contributions to polemical debates over ideas. The differences signaled by these tributes provoke the central questions for this book: Have think tanks generally evolved from producing painstaking research and objective writing to pursuing ideological agendas with far-reaching impact in the war of ideas? If so, what accounts for these transformations, and what are their consequences for the role and influence of their products -expertise and ideas -in American policy making?
Experts have typically been thought of as neutral, credible, and above the fray of the rough and tumble of policy making. Progressive reformers early in the twentieth century turned to the burgeoning social sciences for salvation. Reformers believed that the new ranks of policy experts trained at universities would be capable of usurping patronage politics; experts would develop real solutions to the social and economic instabilities that stemmed from the Industrial Revolution. American politics and American society would be better informed and much improved thanks to their efforts.
While full confidence in expertise waned in the decades that followed, the training of new policy experts became an obsession of reformers through much of the first two-thirds of the twentieth century. The obsession was reflected in the formation and expansion of social science departments and policy schools at universities across the country. It was reflected as well in the founding of scores of independent think tanks, organizations intended to produce policy-relevant research for Washington decision makers. These developments were observed by twentieth-century scholars of the policymaking process and contribute to what remains the prevailing understanding of experts in American policy making, as important background voices that bring rational, reasoned analysis to long-term policy discourse based on the best evidence available. From Charles Merriam to Harold Lasswell to John Kingdon, political scientists have portrayed research as principally affecting a "general climate of ideas which, in turn, affects policymakers' thinking in the long run."
3 Technical research can inform particular policy provisions; consistent findings from many studies over time can effectively transform ways of thinking about policy issues.
4 Scholars quarrel over whether policy research is most helpful in offering specific prescriptions for public problems or, as is more commonly suggested, as general enlightenment on public issues. 5 But by most all appraisals, more experts are good for policy making. For much of the twentieth century, this judgment was accurate; experts fulfilled these mandates. Even if their work was sometimes used by others for quite political purposes, experts remained ostensibly neutral and detached. Experts offered ideas and policy prescriptions that were rigorously crafted, rational, and, in the long run, helpful to the work of decision makers.
Contrary to these earlier experiences and scholarly understandings, however, by the end of the twentieth century, the ranks of real-life policy experts scarcely conformed to the promise of making policy choices clearer and more rigorous and decisions necessarily more rational. In 2002, as members of Congress considered reauthorization of the welfare reforms first enacted in 1996, there was little agreement among the experts outside of government recommending changes to the 1996 law. Experts produced studies advocating everything from expansions in child care subsidies and low-income housing vouchers to provisions that promote marriage and sexual abstinence. Along with little agreement among them on how to revise the law, there was also little restraint among experts in expressing their views. Far from reservedly offering detached analysis to affect policy decisions in the long run, many of those who fashioned themselves experts were clamoring to make frequent, loud, aggressive contributions to the immediate public debates over welfare reform. They held press conferences and forums, offered congressional testimony, and sponsored dueling policy briefs. Much of this work emanated from experts and analysts based at think tanks, the numbers of which quadrupled from fewer than 70 to more than 300 between 1970 and the turn of the century.
One typical exchange during this debate was over the effects of welfare on marriage rates. Analysts at the Heritage Foundation, Brookings Institution, Progressive Policy Institute, and Center on Budget and Policy Priorities each produced studies on the subject.
7 In fact, between fall 2001 and spring 2002, each promoted an assortment of reports, policy briefs, and press releases on the topic, followed by public briefings, conferences, and press events, all in anticipation of Congress's reauthorization of the legislation, due by fall 2002. And this think tank work was noted; scholars from the Heritage Foundation, Brookings Institution, Progressive Policy Institute, and Center on Budget and Policy Priorities obtained media visibility for this work that greatly exceeded that for the work of counterparts on the issue based at universities.
8
The presence of these conflicting, highly visible expert voices illustrates the great distance between historical and scholarly understandings of experts and the ways in which they are most visible and active today. The example points as well to the central role of think tanks in producing research in contemporary policy debates. Many of the most visible expert voices today emanate from public policy think tanks. These think tanks have contributed to a transformation in the role of experts in American policy making. Many experts now behave like advocates. They are not just visible but highly contentious as well. They more actively market their work than conventional views of experts would suggest; their work, in turn, often represents pre-formed points of view rather than even attempts at neutral, rational analysis. This book examines these developments and their consequences for American policy making. In his analysis of the attributes and roles of experts, Kingdon clearly differentiates the "policy community" from the "political people." Policy experts are part of the former. In his revised edition of Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policy, he remains committed to the view that politicians and experts operate in mutually exclusive spheres. He observes:
As to the policy and political streams, I still find it useful to portray them as independent of one another, but then sometimes joined. . . . The policy community concentrates on matters like technical detail, cost-benefit analyses, gathering data, conducting studies, and honing proposals. The political people, by contrast, paint with a broad brush, are involved in many more issue areas than the policy people are, and concentrate on winning elections, promoting parties, and mobilizing support in the larger polity.
9
Kingdon maintains that researchers and research organizations are generally peripheral to the hard-fought endgames of policy making. Their research is brought to bear by others, including elected officials, interest group leaders, and journalists, who are among the "political people."
Like Kingdon, scholars in the first half of the twentieth century believed that social scientists were equipped to improve the quality of political debate by providing methodologically rigorous, defensible (if not irrefutable) prescriptions for solving policy problems and that they could and should do so while remaining detached, without becoming mired in the messy and divisive political process.
10 A similar basic view persisted after World War II. In a volume about the Policy Sciences, published in 1951, Easton Rothwell predicted:
The policy sciences can serve the need for clarification. They offer rapidly developing techniques for making assumptions explicit and for testing their validity in terms of both the basic values which policy seeks to realize and the actualities of human relations to which policy must be applied. By the method of converting general principles into specific indices of action, the policy sciences provide 9 Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies, Second Edition, p. 228. 10 Charles Merriam was one of the leaders of this movement as organizer of the Social Science Research Council in the 1920s. He saw his effort as aimed at suggesting "certain possibilities of approach to a method, in the hope that others may take up the task and through reflection and experiment eventually introduce more intelligent and scientific technique into the study and practices of government, and into popular attitudes toward the governing process." Merriam, New Aspects of Politics, p. xiii.
criteria by which to test the applicability of general principles in specific situations. They also equip the policy-maker with a sufficiently sharp image of the full implications of given postulates to enable him to avoid conflicts of principle within the program of action.
11
Such optimism was echoed by Harold Lasswell, who added the caveat that "the policy approach is not to be confounded with the superficial idea that social scientists ought to desert science and engage full time in practical politics. Nor should it be confused with the suggestion that social scientists ought to spend most of their time advising policy-makers on immediate questions." 12 Through much of the twentieth century, it was viewed as neither desirable that experts should be nor realistic that they could be influential by engaging directly with policy makers in active political debates.
Yet it is a central determination of this book that many contemporary policy experts do seek an active and direct role in ongoing political debates. Far from maintaining a detached neutrality, policy experts are frequently aggressive advocates for ideas and ideologies; they even become brokers of political compromise. Many of these most aggressive experts are based at think tanks; think tanks have become an infrastructure and an engine for their efforts.
The Study of Think Tanks
I attribute substantial importance to a type of organization that has received little scholarly attention. Fewer than a dozen books published since 1970 focus on American think tanks. 14 One reason why think tanks historically have been granted little attention by social scientists relates to the traditional characteristics of think tanks; another relates to the biases of social scientists, especially political scientists. On the one hand, until the 1960s, American think tanks were generally low-profile actors in the policymaking process. Think tank scholars developed important and frequently used research and ideas for policy makers to assimilate, but these scholars rarely debated them publicly or in highly visible ways either with one another or with other influential actors in the political process.
15 As Kent Weaver recalls, Brookings scholars had a running joke that their "books [we]re written for policymakers and read by college students."
16 Think tank research was generally not intended to grab headlines but rather to become infused into the political lexicon over time. This low profile has contributed to their attracting little scholarly attention.
The lack of attention to think tanks also reflects the outlook of the scholars who might be most likely to study them. long had difficulty accounting for the role of ideas and expertise in American politics, the principal products of think tanks. As Peter Hall observes:
Ideas are generally acknowledged to have an influence over policymaking. . . . But that role is not easily described. Any attempt to specify the conditions under which ideas acquire political influence inevitably teeters on the brink of reductionism, while the failure to make such an attempt leaves a large lacuna at the center of our understanding of public policy.
17
A generation of political science scholarship has largely neglected this "lacuna," treating interests, often tied to economically rational calculations, as the principal and overriding source of power in American policy making. In these characterizations, ideas and expertise represent strategic currency in the defense of interests but not substantively important and independent forces.
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This limited view of the role of expertise may have been more justifiable in an era when the underlying "rules of the game" were basically agreed by scholars to consist of a "consensus" in support of expanding social welfare commitments on the domestic front. The political role of ideas has not gone unnoticed by positive political theorists. Their theories, however, tend to view ideas as epiphenomenal rather than causal, instrumental rather than normative. These theories note that innovative politicians use agendas, voting, and issues strategically and that these resources may include new ideas. But ideas in this view are little more than additional tools in the politician's kit bag. From the theorist's perspective, ideas may be even less than this -if they obscure the "real" interests that lie beneath them.
the policymaking process than contending ideas of the appropriate role and scope of government.
19 When the underlying tenets of Keynesian economics were basically shared by Republicans and Democrats alike, for example, visible battles were often restricted to competing interests' claims to public privileges and resources.
20
Through this period a diverse literature emerged about the attributes and influence of visible and aggressive interest-based organizations.
21
Many scholars illuminated the efforts and underlying biases associated with interest group politics and the people who participate in the organization of these groups.
22 This empirical scholarship, however, pays little attention to ideas, expertise, or ideological cleavages, and it virtually ignores the efforts of think tanks and experts generally in the political and policymaking processes.
19 Lowi characterizes this period as one of "interest group liberalism." This predicament led him to complain, "The decline of a meaningful dialogue between a liberalism and a conservatism has meant the decline of a meaningful adversary political proceedings in favor of administrative, technical, and logrolling politics. . . . The emerging public philosophy, interest-group liberalism, has sought to solve the problems of public authority in a large modern state by defining them away. . . . Interest-group liberalism seeks to justify power by avoiding law and by parceling out to private parties the power to make public policy." Theodore J. Lowi, The End of Liberalism (New York: W. W. Norton, 1979), pp. 43-4. 20 These battles were often intense; for if there was an underlying "expansionist consensus," there was also great controversy over the substance of this expansion, especially on noneconomic issues like civil rights and foreign policy. 21 At least since Truman's The Governmental Process, interests and interest groups have guided pluralist inquires and understandings of the political process. David B. Truman, The Governmental Process (New York: Knopf, 1951) . Olson complicated understandings of the role of economic self-interest and rationality in group politics in The Logic of Collective Action (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965). The result has been an enhanced and enlarged debate over the role of interests and interest groups in the political and policymaking process. For all of the contention that has surrounded these scholarly debates, few have sought to raise the profile or importance of ideas and expertise. Rather, debates have revolved around the precise role of interests and interest groups in politics and the factors that account for their foundation and growth in the face of counter-incentives to act self-interestedly. Interestingly, while the political environment by many accounts began to favor the preferences of conservatives in the 1970s and 1980s, interest group scholars focused particular energy on understanding the proliferation of mostly liberal public interest and citizen groups. Since Berry's assessment of the proliferation and influence of mostly liberal-minded public interest groups, scholars have followed his example with extensive analysis of the origins, membership, and influence of these organizations.
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While an important area of study, public interest group scholarship and the interest group literature more generally are of little help in coming to terms with the relationship of organizational politics with the ascendance of conservative principles and ideologies in American politics. By contrast, a focus on think tanks helps to draw links between organized group efforts and developments in the broader political environment.
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As the number of think tanks has grown in recent decades, well more than half of those that have emerged have represented identifiable ideological proclivities in their missions and research. The overwhelming majority of these ideological think tanks have been broadly conservative, producing work that favors limited government, free enterprise, and personal freedom. So as contending ideas and ideologies have risen in profile as the principal fodder of political and policy debates, and as think tanks have themselves become more often ideological -frequently conservative -and aggressively promotional, think tanks and their products have come to warrant greater attention. An appreciation of think tanks is helpful not just for understanding the political role of expertise and ideas in American policy making but for accounting for how ideology informs policy making. What Defines Think Tanks?
Considerable disagreement exists over the organizations to which the label "think tank" refers. In some accounts, they are undifferentiated from government research organizations such as the General Accounting Office and the Congressional Research Service. 26 They are occasionally equated with university-affiliated research centers and institutes.
27 In some instances, research organizations based at interest groups, such as the AARP's Policy Institute, are referred to as think tanks.
28 I view none of the aforementioned as think tanks.
I define think tanks as independent, non-interest-based, nonprofit organizations that produce and principally rely on expertise and ideas to obtain support and to influence the policymaking process. Operationally, think tanks are 501(c)3 nonprofit organizations that conduct and disseminate research and ideas on public policy issues. Politically, think tanks are aggressive institutions that actively seek to maximize public credibility and political access to make their expertise and ideas influential in policy making.
In truth, drawing irrefutable distinctions between think tanks and other types of organizations is neither entirely possible nor desirable; rather, institutional boundaries are frequently amorphous and overlapping. Nonetheless, the products and objectives of think tanks are central to any clarification of how think tanks might be differentiated from other actors in their operations and influence. 1995) , defining "the boundaries of our policy debates" (Smith, The Idea Brokers, p. xiii) , and appearing at too many different points in the political and policy processes to highlight any one (Polsby, "Tanks but No Tanks").
Think tanks care about maximizing their credibility because, compared with interest groups, think tanks rarely have an explicit and specifically identifiable constituency whom they represent in the eyes of policy makers. Think tanks cannot rely on the size or strength of a voting constituency to carry weight and influence with policy makers. While the AARP might produce research in efforts to affect policymaking decisions, millions of older Americans provide their central and strongest organizational leverage for influencing policy. By contrast, think tanks, even ones that seek to speak for and that benefit from the support of those who share an underlying ideology, are ultimately and fundamentally subject to the credibility and believability of their research products -and vulnerable to attacks on them.
In order to achieve credibility, think tanks seek to maximize their independence. The seriousness with which think tank research is taken depends on its being viewed as independent of specific financial interests. As subsequent chapters illustrate, many think tanks, even those that actively promote research aligned with particular ideologies or points of view, seek to portray an independence from narrow groups of supporters.
Think tanks also pursue political access. Think tanks may aim to inform and affect quite different audiences by their research; but, particularly in recent years, think tanks rarely issue reports and passively move on to their next study. Think tanks seek to gain notice for their research among relevant decision makers and seek access to them in order to influence political outcomes. Whether writing op-eds about the importance of marriage in relation to welfare reauthorization or attracting opportunities to testify before Congress on environmental regulation, most think tanks make establishing access an explicit part of their missions.
29 Their efforts to develop access have consequences for their influence; and, in recent years, these efforts have affected perceptions of the role and effectiveness of experts in policy making generally.
Think Tanks in a Period of Growth
The origins of the term "think tank" are ambiguous, with most reports suggesting that the label arose during World War II in reference to military research and development organizations. 30 With little consensus in recent decades about what organizations can or should claim the label "think tank," some think tank leaders are actually reluctant to have their organizations categorized as think tanks and nervous, once classified, about what other organizations might be considered among their ranks. 31 Offsetting the apprehensions of some organizations are the eager efforts of some interest groups to win the label "think tank," for whatever added credibility and stature it might bring their efforts.
A result of this jockeying to win or avoid the label is that determining the number of think tanks operating in American politics at any particular moment is difficult. While other types of organizations, like universities and trade associations, may undergo processes of accreditation or may have clear and consistent prestige or survival incentives associated with self-identification as particular types of organizations, think tanks, as I have defined them, may be as apt to reject the label "think tank" as to accept it.
My estimate of the number of think tanks operating in American politics is based on an examination of references from directories, books, and scholarly articles about think tanks as well as newspaper and magazine clippings. The single most comprehensive source of think tank listings, and the one upon which I depend most, is Hellebust's Think Tank Directory. 32 The 1996 directory records entries for 1,212 independent and university-affiliated "think tank-like organizations," organizations that were assessed to be "nonprofit public policy research organization [s] ,
